COMMENTS
THE VEXING PROBLEM OF THE PURELY

ECONOMIC LOSS IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: AN INJURY
IN SEARCH OF A REMEDY
After more than a half century of siege by consumer advocates, the
"citadel of privity" has finally fallen.' Every American jurisdiction now
permits a "remote ' 2 consumer who is personally injured by a defective,
unreasonably dangerous product to proceed directly against the manufacturer of the product upon the theory of negligence.2 In a majority of
jurisdictions, the privity rule has been relaxed still further so that
anyone who might foreseeably be endangered by a defective product
may bring a negligence action for personal injuries against a remote
1 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.
791 (1966). See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 96-104 (4th ed. 1971); Donnelly, After
the Fall of the Citadel: Exploitation of the Victory Or Consolidation of All Interests?, 19
SYRAcusE L. REv. 1 (1967); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
Chief Judge Cardozo is widely credited with first analogizing the privity rule to a
citadel. Forty-one years ago in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E.
441, 445 (1931), he stated:
The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.
How far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite subject of juridical discussion . ..
The common law requirement that a plaintiff had to be in privity of contract with
the defendant in order to bring an action grounded in negligence or breach of warranty is
illustrated in the old English cases of Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex.
1842), and Longmeid v. Holliday, 155 Eng. Rep. 752, 754-55 (Ex. 1851).
2 The term "remote" will be used herein to refer to a relationship between a
consumer and a manufacturer in which the parties are removed from one another in the
distributive chain so that no privity of contract exists between them. See generally Annot.,
13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1093-1100 (1967) and the cases cited therein.
3 W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 96, at 643. Cf. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d
113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
Justice Jones in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383,
407-08, 221 A.2d 320, 332-33 (1966) (footnote omitted) (quoting from Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d
45 (1961)) stated:
Many of the leading scholars in the field as well as courts in other jurisdictions
have with great logic and persuasion illustrated the unsoundness and illogic
of retaining the concept of privity in the field of products liability. Dissatisfaction
with the requirement of privity "(... stems from the recognition that it is completely unrealistic ... to limit a manufacturer's breach of warranty liability to his
immediate vendee, who is most often himself a vendor who intends not to use,
but merely to serve as a commercial conduit for, the product, or to limit a retailer's breach of warranty liability to his immediate vendee when . . . both the
retailer and his vendee are well aware at the time of the sale of the product that
others than the vendee will use or come in contact with it)"....
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manufacturer of the product. The usual rationale for this far-reaching
development in the law of negligence is that the manufacturer, by
placing a product on the market, assumes a responsibility to the public
which rests not upon contract, but upon the foreseeability of harm to
the members of the public if due care is not taken in the manufacturing
and marketing of his product. 5
A similar, if not as far-reaching, relaxation of the privity rule has
occurred in the law of warranty. In many jurisdictions, personally
injured family members and household guests of the purchaser of a
defective product may now bring actions for breach of warranty directly
against the manufacturer of the product. 6 In a few of these jurisdictions,
the privity rule has even been relaxed to the extent that consumers more
remote than the family members and household guests of the purchaser, such as the employees of the purchaser, have now been granted
standing to bring personal injury actions in warranty against manufacturers of defective products. 7 This relaxation of the privity rule in the
law of warranty has usually been rationalized upon the basis of diverse
and imaginative legal fictions, such as that the remote consumer is a
third-party beneficiary of the sales contract; the purchaser is merely an
agent for the remote consumer; a warranty of quality runs with the
product; and the manufacturer's advertisements create express warranties directly to the remote consumer." But despite these innovative legal
theories for circumventing the privity rule, relaxation of the rule has
generally proceeded at a much slower pace in the law of warranty than
it has in the law of negligence. The concept of privity had its origin in
4 See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 100, at 662; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395
(1965). See also Anderson v. Linton, 178 F.2d 304, 308-09 (7th Cir. 1949) (applying Iowa
law).
5 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See generally
Annot., 6 A.L.R3d 12 (1966); Annot., 3 A.LR.3d 1016 (1965); Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1111
(1960).
6 W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 97, at 653-55. See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp.
78, 89 (D. Hawaii 1961) (applying Hawaii law); McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp.,
137 So. 2d 563, 566-67 (Fla. 1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 413,
161 A.2d 69, 99-100 (1960).
7 See, e.g., Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 442-43, 225 N.YS.2d 137, 142 (1962);
Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 66 Wash. 2d 187, 193, 401 P.2d 844, 847-48 (1965). But see
Griffith v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 105 Ga. App. 588, 592, 125 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1962); Hahn v.
Ford Motor Co., 256 Iowa 27, 31-33, 126 N.W.2d 350, 352-54 (1964); Berzon v. Don Allen
Motors, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 530, 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d 643, 643-44 (1965). See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, § 97; Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQ.
L. REv. 1 (1963).
8 Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REy. 119, 152-55 (1958), lists
twenty-nine such theories.

1972]

COMMENTS

the law of contract. Consequently, it is more deeply rooted in the law
of contract than it is in the law of tort.9
Prior to these significant developments in the law of warranty and
negligence, a consumer who was injured by a defective product could
proceed only against the immediately preceding party in the product's
distributive chain. This party was commonly the purchaser, retailer or
distributor of the product, but seldom the manufacturer. These parties
often proved to be both elusive and financially unresponsible. Consequently, the injured consumer was all too frequently frustrated in his
attempt to secure just compensation for his injuries. Relaxation of the
privity rule effectively remedied this particular problem by permitting
the injured remote consumer to proceed directly against the ultimately
responsible party-the manufacturer of the defective product. 10
Notwithstanding the removal of the privity obstacle, the theories
of negligence and warranty remain somewhat less than ideal theories
of recovery for the injured remote consumer. In order for an injured
consumer to recover from a manufacturer upon the theory of negligence, the consumer must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the manufacturer was negligent in producing, inspecting or marketing the defective product. Unfortunately, except in the most obvious
instances of negligent conduct, it is difficult for the injured consumer
to acquire adequate proof that it was the manufacturer, and not any of
the intermediaries in the distributive chain, who was responsible for
the defect' in the product.1 In many cases, the injured consumer, who
may be hospitalized and unable to earn a living, has neither the resources nor the knowledge to sustain the kind of investigative effort
necessary to secure evidence sufficient to establish negligence on the
part of the manufacturer. The problem of proof is further compounded
by the unfortunate fact that in the milieu of modem manufacturing
and marketing conditions, defective products are quite often produced,
9 See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
10 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Justice
Francis discussed the inequities heaped upon the remote consumer by the privity rule in
the modem marketplace. Id. at 374-78, 161 A.2d at 78-80. See also Sheftman v. Balfour
Housing Corp., 37 Misc. 2d 468, 234 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Tri City Fur Foods, Inc.
v. Ammerman, 7 Wis. 2d 149, 96 N.W.2d 495 (1959). Cf. Kasler & Cohen v. Slavouski, [1928]
1 K.B. 78.
11 See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 95, at 633-34 and cases cited therein. See generally
Ashe, So You're Going to Try a Products Liability Case, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 66 (1961);
P. Keeton, Products Liability-ProblemsPertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26
(1965); P. Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L.
REV. 675 (1963).
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inspected, and marketed in the absence of negligence on the part of
12
anyone.
The heavy burden of proof would be alleviated if only the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor were readily available to the injured consumer.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, plaintiff secures the benefit of
a rebuttable presumption that defendant was negligent upon proving:
(1) that the injury-producing instrumentality was in defendant's exclusive and effective control up to the time of the accident, and (2) that
the accident was of such a nature that it would not ordinarily occur in
the absence of negligence on the part of someone. 13 Unfortunately, one
or both of these elements are frequently absent in products liability
cases. As stated above, injury-producing, defective products are quite
often produced and marketed in the absence of negligence on the part
of anyone; and it is the nature of the modem marketplace that the manufacturer seldom has exclusive and effective control of the injury-producing, defective product up to the time of the consumer's injury. Finally,
the injured consumer remains subject to the traditional negligence
defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the brief
negligence statute of limitation. 14 As in any ordinary negligence action,
the consumer who is injured by a defective product must evade this
network of affirmative defenses to secure effective compensation for his
injuries. 15
The burden of proof, a preponderance of the evidence, and the
statutory period of limitation'0 are the same when the injured con12 See generally W.

PROSSER,

supra note I, § 103, at 671-76; articles cited note 11 supra.

13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965). See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 39,

at 211-28. For applications of the principle to products liability, see Woodworkers Tool
Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667, 674-76 (9th Cir. 1951) (applying California law); Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co. v. De [ape, 109 F.2d 598, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1940) (applying California
law); Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 444-46, 247 P.2d 344, 348-49 (1952);
Killian v. Logan, 115 Conn. 437, 440-41, 162 A. 30, 32 (1932); Peterson v. Minnesota Power &
Light Co., 207 Minn. 387, 389-92, 291 N.W. 705, 706-07 (1940).
14 See Nichols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1929); H.J. Heinz Co.
v. Duke, 196 Ark. 180, 116 S.W.2d 1039 (1938); O'Brien v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 255 Mass.
553, 152 N.E. 57 (1926); Crocker v. Baltimore Dairy Lunch Co., 214 Mass. 177, 100 N.E.
1078 (1913); Swenson v. Purity Baking Co., 183 Minn. 289, 236 N.W. 310 (1931); Smith v.
Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942). But see Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938); Richenbaker v. California Packing Corp.,
250 Mass. 198, 145 N.E. 281 (1924).
15 See Pinto v. Clairol, Inc., 324 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1963) (applying Kentucky law);
Siemer v. Midwest Mower Corp., 286 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1961) (applying New York law);
Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 248, 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1960); Barbe v. Barbe, 378 P.2d 314 (Okla. 1962); Scalzo v. Marsh, 13 Wis. 2d 126,
108 N.W.2d 163 (1961).
16 UCC § 2-725 (West 1972) provides that an action for breach of contract must be
brought within four years of the date the cause of action accrued. The four-year period
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sumer chooses to proceed against the manufacturer of a defective product upon the theory of warranty, express or implied, as when he chooses
to proceed in negligence. But all that the consumer is required to establish under the warranty theory is that a breach of warranty occurred
and that the breach proximately caused his injuries. 17 It is, therefore,
more desirable from the point of view of the injured consumer to
proceed upon the theory of warranty than upon the theory of negligence. Nevertheless, the theory of warranty, like negligence, has a
fundamental drawback which often prevents the injured consumer
from securing an effective remedy. The warranty theory of recovery is
based upon the law of sales, as it is now embodied in the Uniform
Commercial Code.' 8 The Code, which is predicated upon the proposition that the relative bargaining strengths of the contracting parties are
substantially the same, permits a wide range of freedom for manufacturers to disclaim or severely limit any liability that they might
possibly incur for defective products. 19 The Code also requires that
plaintiff give notice of a breach of warranty within a short period of
time after its alleged occurrence, or be barred from a remedy. 20 Unfortunately, the consumer in the modem commercial world seldom
occupies a position of equal bargaining strength vis-it-vis the manufacturer and usually has only a scant knowledge of the law of sales. Therefore, it is a rare occasion when the injured consumer is not also the
victim of a disclaimer, liability limitation or notice provision which
21
prevents him from securing effective compensation for his injuries.
Moreover, despite its purported demise, the privity requirement still
retains a surprising amount of vitality in the law of warranty. Some
jurisdictions still refuse to permit an injured remote consumer who is
may, by agreement of the parties, be shortened to not less than a one-year period, but it
may not be lengthened. Many jurisdictions, however, have a two-year statute of limitation
that covers all personal injury actions irrespective of whether they are brought in negligence
or contract. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (1952); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 118 N.J.
Super. 116, 286 A.2d 718 (App. Div. 1972); Garfield v. Furniture Fair-Hanover, 113 N.J.
Super. 509, 274 A.2d 325 (L. Div. 1971).
17 UCC §§ 2-607(4) and 2-715(2)(b).
18 The Uniform Commercial Code has now been adopted by forty-nine states, the
District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands; only Louisiana has not adopted the Code as
of the date of this publication.
19 UCC §§ 2-316, 2-718, and 2-719. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (1943); Note, Economic Loss in
Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 958-64 (1966).
20 UCC § 2-607(3). See generally DeChaine, Products Liability and the Disclaimer, 4
WILLAMETrE L.J. 364 (1967); James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAs L. REv. 44 (1955); Annot.,
6 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966).
21 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403-04, 161 A.2d 69, 94-95 (1960).
Cf. UCC §§ 2-316, 2-607, 2-718, and 2-719.
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further removed in the distributive chain than the family members and
household guests of the purchaser to recover upon the theory of war22
ranty against the manufacturer of a defective product.
In an effort to provide the remote consumer with a more effective
remedy than those provided by the law of negligence and warranty, a
growing majority of jurisdictions in this country have provided an
23
alternative remedy by adopting the doctrine of strict liability in tort.
As it applies to products liability actions, the doctrine of strict liability
W. PRossER, supra note 1, § 97, at 655. Cf. UCC § 2-318, Comment 3.
The following jurisdictions allow recovery upon the theory of strict liability in tort
in personal injury and wrongful death actions brought against remote manufacturers of
defective products: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244
(Alaska 1969); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 6 Ariz. App. 122, 430 P.2d 701 (1967); Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962);
Schenfeld v. Norton Co., 391 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1968) (applying Colorado law); Garthwait
v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So.
2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470
P.2d 240 (1970); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Greeno
v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (applying Indiana law); Perfection
Paint.& Color Co. v. Konduris, - Ind. App. -, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970); Hawkeye-Security
Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Allen v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
403 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1966); Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 302 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La.
1969) (applying Louisiana law); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133
N.W. 2d 129 (1965); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967);
Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 841 (S.D. Miss. 1970) (applying Mississippi law);
State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill,
Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970) (applying Montana law); Hacker v. Rector, 250 F.
Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (applying Missouri law); Keener v. Dayton Electric Mfg. Co.,
445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601
(1971); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966);
Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730,
497 P.2d 732 (1972); Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (applying
New York law); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185
(1966); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965); Cochran v. Brooke,
243 Ore. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Ritter
v. Narragansett Elec. Co. v. American Motors Corp., - R.I. -, 283 A.2d 255 (1971);
Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1967) (applying South Dakota law);
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); Shamrock Fuel & Oil
Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (rex. 1967); Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970)
(applying Vermont law); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713
(1970); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
An analogous class of cases allows recovery in strict liability for economic losses sustained as a result of an ultrahazardous activity. See, e.g., Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor,
215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949); Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Ore. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961).
22
23
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imposes liability upon the manufacturer for those personal injuries
that are proximately caused by his defective and unreasonably dangerous products. 24 The manufacturer is not absolutely liable and is not an
insurer for all personal injuries suffered by a consumer of his product.
A plaintiff seeking to hold a manufacturer liable upon the theory of
strict liability must establish three elements by a preponderance of the
evidence: (1) that he was injured by the product, (2) that the product
was in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition when it left
the hands of the manufacturer, and (3) that there was a chain of proximate causal connection between such condition and plaintiff's injuries. 25
Thus, the burden of proof is the same in strict liability as it is in negligence and in warranty, but the facts to be proved are similar to the
facts which must be proved in a breach of warranty action. The principal defense available in a negligence action, contributory negligence,
and the defenses available in a warranty action, lack of privity, lack of
notice, disclaimers, and liability limitations, are not valid defenses or
objections under the theory of strict liability.2 6 Nevertheless, misuse of
the product and assumption of the risk are valid defenses of which a
27
manufacturer can avail himself.
24 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 622-23, 210 N.E.2d
182, 186-87 (1965); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 121 (Miss. 1966); Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 452-53, 212 A.2d 769, 779 (1965).
See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, §§ 98-100; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comments g and i at 351-53 (1965).
25 W. PRossER, supra note 1, § 103, at 671-72. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g at 351. See generally Emroch, Pleading and Proof
in a Strict Products Liability Case, 1966 INs. L.J. 581 (1966); Note, Products Liability and
the Problem of Proof, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1777 (1969); Note, Proof of Defect in a Strict
Products Liability Case, 22 U. ME. L. REv. 189 (1970); 45 Nm. L. REv. 189 (1966).
26 W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 98, at 657-58; § 102, at 670.
Strict liability in tort is "hardly more than what exists under implied warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer, requirements
of notice of defect, and limitation through inconsistencies with express warranties."
Id. § 98, at 658 n.57 (quoting from Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D.
Ind. 1965)). See also Ilnicki v. Montgomery Ward Co., 371 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1966) (applying Indiana law); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
27 Dean Prosser states that the contradiction as to whether contributory negligence
is a defense to a claim in strict liability is a superficial one of language only. He contends
that contributory negligence is available as a defense only when the negligence consists of
proceeding voluntarily to encounter a known, unreasonable danger. In such a situation,
contributory negligence actually amounts to assumption of the risk. W. PROSSER, supra
note 1, § 103, at 670-71. See Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962)
(nightgown caught on fire while smoking in bed after taking a sleeping pill); Gutelius
v. General Elec. Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 455, 99 P.2d 682 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940) (continued
operation of washing machine with knowledge of defective shifter lever); Topeka Mill &
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The precise details of the doctrine of strict liability vary among
the adopting jurisdictions, but the most salient features of the doctrine
are set forth in the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from
28
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Two basic arguments have usually been offered to justify the application of strict liability. One is that the great mass of the consuming
public has neither adequate knowledge nor sufficient opportunity to
determine whether the products they purchase are defective. As a result, they must rely upon the skill, care, and reputation of the maker.
The public interest in human life and safety demands that the law give
the consumer the maximum protection against dangerous defects in
products which consumers must buy and against which they are helpless to protect themselves. Therefore, concern for the general welfare
justifies the imposition of full responsibility upon the manufacturers
of such products for the harm they cause, even though such manufacturers have exercised the utmost care in producing their products.
Manufacturers are in a position to effectively become insurers of the
consuming public; and, as such, they can recoup their losses by passing
Elev. Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964 (1950) (feed known to be injuring
chickens); Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955) (oil burner known
not to be functioning properly); Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18
(1965) (opening glass toothbrush container with pressure). See generally 2 L. FRUMER &
M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 16A(5)(f) (1970, Supp. 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965); Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based
on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 267; R. Keeton, Assumption of Products
Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965); Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1968); Comment, Tort Defenses to
Strict Products Liability, 20 SYRAcusE L. REv. 924 (1969); Comment, Products Liability:
For the Defense-Contributory Fault, 33 TENN. L. REv. 464 (1966); Note, Contributory
Negligence as a Defense to Warranty Actions, 39 TEMPLE L.Q. 361 (1966).
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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the cost of the insurance on to the consuming public in the form of
29
higher prices.
A second argument for the imposition of strict liability is that the
manufacturer, by placing a product on the market, impliedly represents to the public that it is suitable and safe for consumption or use.
He does everything he can to induce that belief, and he intends and,
indeed, expects that the product will be purchased and used or consumed in reliance upon that representation. The manufacturer, who
has invited and solicited the sale, should not, therefore, be permitted
to avoid responsibility by asserting a disclaimer or claiming that it was
the middleman or intermediary and not he who had a contract with
the unfortunate, injured consumer. The middleman or intermediary in
the distributive chain is usually no more than a mere conduit in the
flow of commerce which is provided for the manufacturer's benefit and
through which the product is conveniently distributed to the ultimate
user or consumer.8 0
In the early stages of the "assault upon the citadel," the privity
rule was relaxed only in negligence and warranty actions involving
defective food or cosmetic products. 8' The earliest applications of the
doctrine of strict liability also occurred in cases of the same nature.8 2
However, the range of application of these doctrines has since been
expanded, first to defective products which are imminently and inherently dangerous 3 and, more recently in some jurisdictions, to any
products which are capable, when defective, of causing personal in29 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c at 349-50;
Prosser (Yale), supra note 1, at 1120.
30 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 468, 150 P.2d 436, 443-44 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 97, at 650.
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment b at 348-49 (1965); Prosser (Yale),
supra note 1, at 1103-10. See, e.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609,
164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
32 W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 97, at 653-54; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment b at 348-49 (1965). See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633
(1913).
3 W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 99, at 658-59; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comments d and i at 350, 352-53 (1965). See, e.g., Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 185 A.2d 919, 923 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962) (defective automobile); Greeman V.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700
(1962) (power tool); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 622-23, 210 N.E.2d 182,
186-87 (1965) (tractor unit); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 383, 161
A.2d 69, 83 (1960) (automobile); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,
436-37, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82-83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1963) (airplane); Markovich v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 272, 149 N.E.2d 181, 185-86 (1958).
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jury. 34 In many jurisdictions, the doctrines of negligence, warranty, and
strict liability have even been applied to provide recovery against remote manufacturers for property damage that is caused by a defective
product. In most of these instances, however, recovery for property
damage has been limited to tangible or physical property damage that
results from a violent accident or physical occurrence. 35 Nevertheless,
recovery has been allowed in such cases irrespective of whether the
property damage occurred to the defective product itself or to other
property within the foreseeable zone of use of the product. 36 In cases
where the tangible property damage was caused by a violent accident or
physical occurrence and was accompanied by a personal injury, recovery
for the property damage has usually been allowed based on the reasoning that the personal injury and tangible property damage resulted from
the same physical event; thus, complete relief should be awarded
to all the injured parties. 37 In cases where the physical property damage
was the only injury which occurred, recovery for the property damage
has been allowed on the rationale that in situations where personal
injuries could have occurred, courts should not hesitate to grant relief
to the party suffering the property damage simply because he was
fortunate enough to have escaped personal injury. 38
Notwithstanding the general inclination to allow recovery from
remote manufacturers for physical property damage, the courts have at
the same time been extremely reluctant to relax the privity requirement
to permit recovery in warranty by a remote consumer for purely economic losses. The courts have also been extremely reluctant to allow
recovery in negligence or in strict liability from anyone in the distributive chain for purely economic losses. Purely economic losses may be
34 See, e.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 94-95 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304
F.2d 149, 151 (9th Cir. 1962) (flammable hula skirt); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J.
70, 87-88, 207 A.2d 314, 323-24 (1965) (unregulated hot water faucet). See also Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Direction for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 838
(1962).
35 See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52, 52-55 (10th Cir. 1953)
(applying Colorado law); Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 865-67, 323
P.2d 227, 228-30 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct. 1958).
86 See, e.g., Spencer v. Madsen, 142 F.2d 820, 823 (10th Cir. 1944) (applying Kansas law);
Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 649, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94, 101 (Dist. Ct. App.
1966); C.D. Herme, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Ky. 1956); Prosser (Yale)
supra note 1, at 1143 and cases cited therein. See generally RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 395 (1965).
37 See, e.g., Spencer v. Madsen, 142 F.2d 820, 823 (10th Cir. 1944) (applying Kansas
law); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623-24, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186-87 (1965).
38 See, e.g., C.D. Herme, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Ky. 1956);
Genesee Cty. Patrons F.R. Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 263 N.Y. 463, 467-72, 189
N.E. 551, 552-55 (1934).
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classified into two basic categories: direct economic losses and indirect
or consequential economic losses. A direct economic loss includes a
diminution in the value of the product as measured by the difference
between the purchase price or value of the product as represented to
the purchaser and the value of the product after discovery of the defect.
This type of direct economic loss is known as a loss of bargain. 39 A
direct economic loss also includes whatever repair costs may be incurred in repairing the defective product and any direct incidental
expenditures which may be incurred in replacing a defective product
which cannot be repaired. On the other hand, indirect or consequential
economic losses include both losses of future business profits and business opportunities. Such losses are commonly referred to as expectation
losses. Consequential economic losses also include any indirect loss resulting from the consumer's inability to secure an effective cover or
replacement for the defective product. An example of such a loss would
be a loss of wages suffered by an owner of a defective automobile who
40
cannot procure substitute transportation to get to work.
The reluctance of the courts to permit recovery in negligence
against remote manufacturers for economic loss is understandable. It
has long been a general principle of tort law that, unlike personal
injuries and physical property damage, "economic interests are not
entitled to protection against mere negligence." '41 The reasons that the
39 Distinctions have been made between a "loss of bargain," which is the difference
between the value of the product as received and its value as represented, and an "out of
pocket loss," which is the difference in value between the purchase price of the product
and its value as received. This distinction is pertinent only insofar as the amount of
damages is concerned and is not pertinent to the question of which types of economic
losses are recoverable. Consequently, the terms will be used interchangeably herein. See
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 110, at 733-36. Compare Franklin, When Worlds Collide:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. Rav. 974, 980-83
(1966) with Note, supra note 19, at 918.
40 Compare the definitions of incidental and consequential damages in UCC § 2-715
with the definitions of the various types of economic loss in Franklin, supra note 39, at
980-83 and Note, supra note 19, at 918.
41 W. PROssER, supra note 1, § 101, at 665. See Karl's Shoe Stores, Ltd. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376 (D. Mass. 1956); TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., I Misc. 2d
477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd without opinion, 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153
N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956). Cf. Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d
583 (1965).
Loss of profits . . . is not the character of harm contemplated by the rule which
renders a manufacturer liable in negligence ....
Amodeo v. Autocraft Hudson, Inc., 195 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (Sup. Ct. 1959), afl'd, 12 App.
Div. 2d 499, 207 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1960).
It has also been traditionally recognized that a party to a contract has no remedy in
negligence for negligent conduct which interferes with the performance of a contract. See,
e.g., Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio L. Abs. 586, 73 N.E.2d 200 (Cuyahoga County,
Ct. App. 1946).
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courts have been reluctant to allow recovery for purely economic losses
by remote consumers against manufacturers upon the theories of warranty and strict liability are more subtle, however, and invite an
analysis of the leading cases dealing with the question.
The leading case allowing recovery in strict liability against a
manufacturer for a purely economic loss resulting from a defectively
manufactured product is a New Jersey case, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc. 42 Santor involved a suit by an ordinary consumer43
against a remote manufacturer of defective carpeting. Plaintiff had
purchased a quantity of defendant-manufacturer's nationally advertised
carpeting from a retail dealer who specified that the carpeting was
"Grade #1." 44 Soon after the purchase, the carpeting developed a number of unsightly lines. Since the dealer had gone out of business and
moved out of state, plaintiff sued defendant-manufacturer directly for
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability to recover for a loss
of bargain in the amount of the purchase price of the carpeting. The
manufacturer, conceding that the carpet had been defectively manufactured, defended on the ground that plaintiff was barred from recovering by the privity rule. He contended that privity of contract was
still required where the defectively manufactured product was unlikely
to be dangerous or cause personal injury to its ultimate user or con45
sumer.

The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this contention and found
unanimously for the plaintiff. The court stated that, although abrogation of the privity requirement and application of the theory of
implied warranty had its "gestative stirrings" in personal injury cases,
the field of operation of implied warranty should not be "fenced in by
such a factor." 46 Stating that a contrary holding would be productive of
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (Francis, J.).
The term "ordinary consumer" is used herein to refer to a consumer who personally uses or consumes the product. An ordinary consumer is unlike a "commercial
consumer" in the respect that he does not make use of the product in his business or
resell the product for profit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment I at
354 (1965).
"Consumers" include not only those who in fact consume the product, but
also those who prepare it for consumption . . . . Consumption includes all ultimate uses for which the product is intended ....
Id.
44 44 N.J. at 55, 207 A.2d at 306. The court indicated only that the carpet was purchased upon the representation that it was "Grade #1." It is not clear whether this
representation was made by the manufacturer or the retailer at the time of the sale. But
the retailer did subsequently confirm to plaintiff that the carpet was of "Grade #1"
quality. Id. at 56-57, 207 A.2d at 307.
45 Id. at 57-58, 207 A.2d at 307-08.
46 Id. at 60, 207 A.2d at 309.
42
43
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wasteful and time-consuming litigation, the court reasoned that there
is" 'no justification for [making] a distinction on the basis of the type of
injury suffered or the type of article or goods involved.' "47 The court,
therefore, concluded that privity of contract was not necessary and that
plaintiff could recover directly against defendant-manufacturer upon
the theory of implied warranty for the loss of the value of the carpeting.

48

Having abolished the privity requirement and provided plaintiff
with a remedy in implied warranty, the court went on to state that
couching plaintiff's remedy in terms of implied warranty was merely
using "a convenient legal device or formalism" to implement the declared public policy of the court, and that plaintiff could alternatively
recover on the theory of strict liability.4 9 Defining the manufacturer's

obligation as what "in justice it ought to be-an enterprise liability...
which should not depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales," 50
the court expressed the duty of the manufacturer as a duty to avoid
producing commodities that are "defective, i.e., not reasonably fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such articles are sold and used .... "51
In limiting its holding to the facts of the case, however, the court
declined to more fully define the term "defective," stating only that
recovery for a defect which causes a purely economic loss depends upon
the "price at which the manufacturer reasonably contemplated that the
article might be sold."' 52 In this regard, the court appeared to be implying that manufacturers would not be liable for defects which cause
only economic losses where the defect in the product was clearly pointed
out to the purchaser in advance of the sale or was sold at a correspond53
ingly low price or on an "as is" basis.

The leading case rejecting extension of the theory of strict liability
in tort to permit recovery for a purely economic loss is a California
47 Id. at 61, 207 A.2d at 309 (quoting from Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., II N.Y.2d 5, 15, 181 N.E.2d 399, 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 370 (1962)).
48 Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 310-11.
49 Id. at 64-66, 207 A.2d at 311-12. Since plaintiff brought suit more than three years
after his cause of action accrued, id. at 56-57, 207 A.2d at 307, presumably the four-year
statute of limitations for contracts, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-725 (1962) was applied. Although two-year statute of limitations, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (1952), governs actions
in strict liability for personal injuries, the four-year statute of limitations apparently
governs all actions for purely economic losses, irrespective of the theory of recovery.
50 Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.

51 Id. at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 312.
52 Id. at 67, 207 A.2d at 313.
53 44 N.J. at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 313. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 28,
403 P.2d 145, 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 30 (1965) (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:145

case, Seely v. White Motor Co.' 4 In Seely, which was decided shortly
after Santor, plaintiff had purchased from a retail dealer a truck manufactured by defendant. Defendant-manufacturer had expressly warranted in the sales contract that the truck was "free from defects in
material and workmanship under normal use and service." 55 Due to
manufacturing defects, however, plaintiff was unable to make use of
the truck, resulting in a loss of bargain and a consequential loss of business profits. Plaintiff sued defendant-manufacturer on the theories of
express warranty and strict liability to recover for the purchase price
56
of the truck and for his loss of business profits.
The California Supreme Court permitted recission of the sales
contract and granted recovery of the lost business profits upon the
contract theory that defendant-manufacturer had expressly warranted
the product to be free of defects. More importantly, however, the
court declared that defendant was not strictly liable in tort for the
reduced value of the truck or for plaintiff's business losses. The court
admitted that the rules of warranty defy rational compensation for
physical injuries. But it asserted that, nevertheless, such rules do function well in a commercial setting such as that presented in the case at
bar, and it feared that to hold defendant-manufacturer strictly liable
for plaintiff's consequential economic losses would expose manufacturers in general to liabilities "for damages of unknown and unlimited
57
scope."
Focusing upon the rationale underlying the imposition of strict
liability on the manufacturer in personal injury cases, the court
reasoned that the doctrine of strict liability rests on the proposition
that "'[t]he cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured,'" a burden which the
manufacturer can best distribute among the consuming public in the
form of higher prices. 58 This reasoning, the court stated, does not
justify requiring the consuming public to pay more for their products
merely to ensure that a manufacturer's product will meet the business
needs of his customer.
A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer
with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on
the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that
63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (Traynor, C.J.).
Id. at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
56 Id. at 12-13, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
57 Id. at 16-17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
58 Id. at 18-19, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (quoting from Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
54

55
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the product will not match his economic expectations unless the
manufacturer agrees that it will.5 9
Interestingly, in an attempt to distinguish the Santor decision,
the Seely court asserted that Santor could be justified only on the basis
of the express representation by the manufacturer that the defective
rug was "Grade #1."60 It is not clear in the Santor opinion, however,
whether that representation was made by the manufacturer or the retail
dealer who was not a party in the case. The more logical inference
appears to be that the representation was made by the retail dealer, and
not by the manufacturer."' In any event, the Santor court did not consider the point.
Justice Peters accepted the result of the majority in Seely, but
rejected their reasoning. He challenged the majority's unsupported
assumption that personal injury ordinarily results in a greater misfortune to the injured victim than economic loss. On the contrary, he
argued, since compensation for personal injury is economic anyway,
it would be inconsistent to deny compensation for purely pecuniary
losses and award money damages for personal injuries. 2 Manufacturers'
liability should not be solely contingent upon the type of injury suffered
by the consumer, but rather upon a single comprehensive standard
applicable to all types of injuries. 63 The type of remedy, he asserted,
should logically depend upon both the nature of the transaction and
the relative bargaining positions between the purchaser and the manufacturer at the time of the sale.
In my opinion [the restrictive statutory provisions relating to
warranty] should not apply to the ordinary consumer, who is
usually unable to protect himself from insidious contractual provisions such as disclaimers, foisted upon him by commercial
enterprises whose bargaining power he is seldom able to match, and
who "'is seldom "steeped in the business practice which justifies"..
the notice requirement ....This does not mean, however, that the
implied warranty sections of the code should not apply within
the world of commerce, where parties generally bargain on a
somewhat equal plane and may be presumed to be familiar with
64
the legal problems involved when defective goods are purchased.
Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
60 Id. at 17-18, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
61 See note 44 supra.
62 63 Cal. 2d at 22-25, 403 P.2d at 154-55, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
63 Id. at 21-27, 403 P.2d at 153-56, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25-28 (Peters, J., concurring and
dissenting).
4 Id. at 27, 403 P.2d at 157, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting)
(footnote omitted) (quoting from Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
61, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 697, 700 (1962)).
59
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Justice Peters proposed that such a standard could be achieved by
equating the definition of the term "defective" with the definition of
the term "unmerchantable," in the sense that the latter term is used in
the Uniform Commercial Code.6 5 Under this approach, the manufacturer would, in the absence of an express warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, be strictly liable only for those economic losses
resulting from defects which would prevent his product from being
suitable for the general purposes for which it was manufactured. The
manufacturer could limit his liability as to economic losses by refusing
to extend warranty coverage to particularized uses. Contrary to the
opinion of the majority, Justice Peters concluded that strict liability
would not subject the manufacturer to risk of unlimited scope where
the defective product failed to meet the particular requirements of the
purchaser. 66 Interestingly, he would permit recovery for both the direct
and consequential economic losses of plaintiff, despite the fact that
plaintiff was a commercial consumer. He reasoned that as owner-driver
of a single truck used for commercial hauling, plaintiff was the final
link in the marketing chain and had no more bargaining power than an
ordinary consumer who purchased a motor vehicle from a retail dealer
67
for personal use.
The conflicting principles set forth in Santor and Seely concerning
recovery in strict liability for economic loss have been adjudicated in
only seven other jurisdictions that have adopted strict liability for
product-caused personal injury.6 8
In Pricev. Gatlin,69 the Oregon Supreme Court was presented with
an action in strict liability for a loss of bargain and consequential
economic losses suffered by the purchaser of a defectively manufactured
tractor. Because the manufacturer was not amenable to suit, the. purchaser sought to hold liable the wholesaler, who was free from fault,
on the ground that he shared in the profits generated by the distribution
of the product. 70 The court stated that it did not believe it proper to
impose enterprise liability for purely economic losses upon an innocent
wholesaler merely because "he happens to lie in the stream of com65

Id. at 25, 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).

Cf. UCC § 2-314.
66 Id. at 25-26, 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
67 Id. at 27-28, 403 P.2d at 157-58, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30 (Peters, J., concurring and
dissenting).
68 Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas.
69 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965).
70 Id. at 317, 405 P.2d at 503.
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merce. ' ' 71 Although it was not presented with the issue of whether
the purchaser might maintain such an action against the manufacturer,
the court implied that it would follow the principles laid down in

Seely:
[T]he social and economic reasons which courts elsewhere have
given for extending enterprise liability to the victims of physical
injury are not equally persuasive in a case of a disappointed buyer
of personal property. See Seely v. White Motor Company ....72
This concept was further developed in a concurring opinion which
predicated liability upon the type of injury or nature of damage caused:
[Personal injury] is usually a personal disaster of major proportions
to the individual both physically and financially and something of
minor importance to the manufacturer or wholesaler against which
they can protect themselves by a distribution of risk through the
price of the article sold. There has not been the same social
necessity to motivate the recovery for strictly economic losses where
therefore his basic earning capacthe damaged person's health, and
73
ity, has remained unimpaired.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 318, 405 P.2d at 503.
73 Id. at 319, 405 P.2d at 504 (Holman, J., concurring). But see the dissent by Justice
O'Connell criticizing the Seely case for relying exclusively upon the warranty rationale. Id.
at 328, 405 P.2d at 508.
Justice O'Connell suggests that it would be appropriate to apply traditional tort
principles in those cases in which the defect caused an accident resulting in personal
injury or physical property damage and to apply the law of misrepresentation in those
cases in which there was no accident and the defect caused purely pecuniary losses. In
the latter category of cases, an innocent misrepresentation would suffice, thereby effectively creating a form of strict liability, as most defects result in misrepresentations. Thus,
the theory of recovery would be determined upon the basis of how the harm occurred.
This approach presents a significant problem, however, as Justice O'Connell failed to
define what an "accident" is. Personal injuries and property damage can conceivably
occur in the absence of an "accident." For instance, in the case where a defective nuclear
device gives off an excessive amount of radiation and slowly harms its user or slowly
causes property damage, is such an event an "accident"? Is the suddenness with which the
harm occurred a reasonable criterion to determine which events constitute accidents and
which do not? The practical problems presented by this approach compel the conclusion
that a distinction based upon the type of harm suffered is clearly preferable to any
distinction based upon how the harm occurred. Franklin, supra note 39, at 986-88.
The "accident requirement" in the negligence area has been criticized for overlooking that it is the injury and the causal connection to the defect in the
product which makes the negligence actionable rather than the exact manner in
which the injury occurred. See 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 197 (1957). The rationale of
the "accident requirement" must be based on the greater risk of personal injury
in such cases. Another problem is .that with many products an "accident" cannot
clearly be distinguished from internal deterioration.
Comment, Manufacturers'Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" DamagesTort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 548 n.54 (1966).
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In Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., the Illinois
Supreme Court was presented with an action in strict liability brought
by a producer of hair lotion against a remote manufacturer of defective
cans to recover for both direct and consequential economic losses. The
cans were furnished in accordance with a supply contract between defendant-manufacturer and an intermediary who packaged plaintiff's hair
lotion. Although defendant was fully aware of the intended use of the
cans and had warranted the cans to be fit for such a purpose, plaintiff
suffered great expense and damage to its commercial reputation when
the cans leaked while in the hands of the retailer.7 5 Notwithstanding its
prior adoption of strict liability in personal injury cases, the court
expressly rejected the applicability of the doctrine in actions for purely
economic losses. 76 Nevertheless, it held that plaintiff, as a third-party
beneficiary of the supply contract, could directly enforce implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose against the remote
77
manufacturer.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 78 which was decided shortly after
Santor and Seely, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected extension of
the doctrine of strict liability to permit recovery for either direct or
consequential economic losses. A farmer, who purchased a defective
tractor from a franchised Ford dealer in reliance upon sales literature
published by Ford Motor Company, sued both Ford and the dealer to
recover for a loss of bargain and expectation losses caused by the tractor's inoperability during the planting season. 79 While relaxing the
privity requirement and permitting recovery directly against Ford on
the theory that the sales literature constituted an express warranty
directly to the farmer, the court refused to extend the doctrine of strict
liability to allow recovery for any type of purely economic loss:
We consider that the judgment in the present case, however,
is sustainable only on the misrepresentation principle as developed,
with appropriate limitations, in 2 Restatement (Second) Torts,
§ 402B (1965) and in a parallel rule relating to pecuniary loss.
There was no showing in the present case that the product was
unreasonably dangerous as well as defective and in that situation
72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966).
Id. at 364-67, 219 N.E.2d at 728-29.
76 Id. at 368,.219 N.E.2d at 730. Strict liability in tort for personal injuries resulting
from a defective product was introduced in Illinois in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32
Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
77 72 Ill. App. 2d at 368-73, 219 N.E.2d at 730-32.
78 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
79 Id. at 402-05, 398 S.W.2d at 241-42.
74
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we find no sufficient grounds for imposing a strict liability on the
manufacturer ....See Seely v. White Motor Co ....80
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey,8 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
refused to allow an action in strict liability against a remote manufacturer for direct and consequential economic losses caused by a weed
control chemical that allegedly damaged plaintiff's cotton crop. Citing
Seely and the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A, the court
stated that for a consumer to recover in strict liability, the defective
product must have been "unreasonably dangerous" and must have
caused "physical harm" to his person or property.8 2 Concluding that the
weed control chemical did not cause "physical harm" to plaintiff's
cotton crop, but was simply "ineffective,"8 s3 the court denied recovery in
strict liability and held that the Uniform Commercial Code controlled
the nature of the obligation arising between the plaintiff and the
manufacturer. While the Code expresses strict neutrality on the privity
issue, privity of contract was, nevertheless, an essential element of the
84
purchaser's cause of action.
In Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit upheld a dismissal of a suit for consequential economic losses suffered by
a disappointed purchaser of a turbine generator. The generator was a
highly specialized piece of machinery built to particular specifications
for use in the purchaser's pulp and paper plant. In the sales contract,
which was directly negotiated by the parties, the manufacturer of the
turbine expressly disclaimed all liability for any consequential economic loss which the purchaser might suffer in the event that the
generator should be defective. When the generator proved to be defective and caused the closing of the plant, the purchaser sued the manufacturer directly upon the theories of implied warranty and strict
Id. at 423, 398 S.W.2d at 250.
81 472 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
82 Id. at 599.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 600. See UCC § 2-318, Comment 3, note 113 infra. The UCC as adopted by
Texas provides that in all cases the application of the privity rule is to be left solely to
the discretion of the courts.
This chapter does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may take
advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the buyer or
whether the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a warranty made to
the buyer may sue a third party other than the immediate seller for deficiencies
in the quality of the goods. These matters are left to the courts for their determination.
Tax. Bus. & CoM. CODE § 2.318 (1968).
85 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970) (applying Arizona law).
80
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liability to recover for his consequential economic losses.88 Applying
Arizona law, the court barred recovery in implied warranty on the basis
of the manufacturer's express disclaimer and stated that strict liability
was inapplicable in the case at bar.8 7 Citing Seely, the court asserted:
"The circumstances of this case do not bring the plaintiff within
that class of consumers, type of transaction, or damages suffered that
created the need for relief based on strict liability in tort. Neither
the philosophy nor the theory of the doctrine of strict liability in
tort nor the actual holdings of the cases involved support an exten'88
sion of the doctrine of strict liability in tort to the present facts."
89
the United States
In Miehle Co. v. Smith-Brooks Printing Co.,
District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed a counterclaim
by a purchaser who sought to recover in strict liability against the
manufacturer of a printing press for consequential economic losses
suffered as a result of an alleged breach of an implied warranty of
fitness for use.90 Applying Colorado law, the court gave little credence
to the purchaser's theory of recovery:

[W]e [have] applied a rule which implied a warranty by the seller
that the product is free from defects which render the product
unreasonably dangerous to the user or his property. This rule imposes liability for physical harm caused thereby to the ultimate
user or his property. The allegations of the complaint do not bring
this action within the rule. 91
Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co. 92 placed Michigan in line
with New Jersey by reinstating a complaint by a small commercial
consumer against a large remote manufacturer seeking recovery for
repair costs, loss of bargain, and expectation losses. The complaint
alleged that golf carts, bought through a distributor for rental purposes on plaintiff's golf course, were defective and continually broke
down.93 Reasoning that strict liability should not be limited only to
consumers suffering personal injuries, the court concluded that plaintiff had a valid claim against the manufacturer for both his loss of
bargain and the repair costs:
86 Id. at 1014-16.
87 Id. at 1020.

88 Id. (quoting from the unpublished district court opinion) (footnotes omitted by
the circuit court).
89 303 F. Supp. 501 (D. Colo. 1969) (applying Colorado law).
90 Id. at 502-03.
91 Id. at 503.
92 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
93 Id. at 604 n.1, 182 N.W2d at 801 n.l.
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On principle the manufacturer should be required to stand
behind his defectively-manufactured product and held to be accountable to the end user even though the product caused neither
accident nor personal injury. The remote seller should not be
insulated from direct liability where he has merely mulcted the
94
consumer.
Although acknowledging that the question was abstractly presented in
the case before it, the court declined comment on the issue of whether
recovery in strict liability should be allowed for plaintiff's expectation
losses until the issue had been decided on its merits.95
Interestingly, the court admitted that the Michigan law as to
manufacturer's liability is "strict liability or something akin to it;" 96
nevertheless, it refused to adopt either the label strict liability and the
terminology of the law of torts or the label implied warranty and the
terminology of the law of contracts.
This entire field of law [manufacturer's liability], which developed
through adaptation and analogy to the law of torts and contracts,
has been plagued by the labels of these analogies and their appurtenant historical impeditions....
. . .Elimination of the old terminology would permit this
field of law to develop sensibly without continuing allegiance to
warranty or tort concepts . . .97
Under this approach, the liability of the manufacturer would be defined solely by the amalgam of developing jurisprudence relating to
98
defective products.
Actions against a remote manufacturer seeking recovery for economic losses arising out of nonviolent circumstances face two developing lines of cases in other jurisdictions: either the jurisdiction (1) has
adopted strict liability for personal injury cases but has not yet been
directly presented with such an action for economic loss; 99 or (2) permits recovery under implied warranty for economic loss but has not yet
Id. at 609, 182 N.W.2d at 804.
Id. at 620, 182 N.W.2d at 811.
96 Id. at 611-12, 182 N.W.2d at 805-06.
9T Id. at 614-16, 182 N.W.2d at 807-08 (footnotes omitted).
98 Id.
99 The following strict liability jurisdictions apparently have not yet been presented
with an action seeking recovery in strict liability for a purely economic loss: Alaska,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See note 23 supra. See, e.g., Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962).
94
95
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adopted strict liability. 00 Illustrative of the former category is Florida.
In Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc.,10 1 the Florida Supreme Court held that
a purchaser had an action for breach of an implied warranty against a
remote manufacturer of an automobile to recover for a loss of bargain
suffered when alleged defects rendered the automobile of value only as
scrap or junk. 02 Illustrative of the latter category is North Dakota. In
Lang v. General Motors Corp.,10 3 the supreme court held that a purchaser of a defective automobile had a cause of action in implied warranty against the remote manufacturer to recover for the diminution in
the value of the automobile. The court stated that when an automobile
is so defective in materials or construction that it cannot be operated
for the ordinary purposes for which it was designed to serve, it is
unreasonable to bar the purchaser from recovering against the manu104
facturer.
The foregoing review of cases demonstrates that the law controlling
recovery for purely economic losses in those jurisdictions that have
adopted strict liability is based on a number of conflicting legal theories and remains in its infant stages of development. The jurisdictions
which have dealt with claims by consumers seeking to recover for purely
economic losses may be classified into two groups: (1) those following
New Jersey which allows recovery in strict liability for a direct economic loss and in warranty for both direct and consequential economic
losses; and (2) those following California which allows recovery only
in warranty for both types of economic loss. According to this distinction, Michigan is classified with New Jersey;' 0 5 and Arizona, Colorado,
06
Illinois, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas are classified with California.1
100 See, e.g., Lang v. Ford Motor Co., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965). Cf. Illustrative of
those jurisdictions which have not adopted strict liability, but which have limited recovery
for personal injury cases to implied warranty are: Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534,
383 S.W.2d 885 (1964); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954); Swift
& Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
101 137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
102 Id. at 240-42.
103 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965).
104 Id. at 806-10.
105 Michigan and New Jersey are grouped together principally on the basis of the
following cases: Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
106 Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas are grouped
together principally upon the basis of the following cases: Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 442 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying Arizona law); Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Miehle Co. v. Smith.
Brooks Printing Co., 303 F. Supp. 501 (D. Colo. 1969) (applying Colorado law); Rhodes
Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966); Price v.
Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398
S.W.2d 240 (1966); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey, 472 S.W.2d 598 (rex. Civ. App. 1971).
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The Santor and Seely decisions and their progeny have generated
a great deal of comment and controversy in the legal community. 7
At the risk of oversimplification, most of this interest has revolved
around the following issues: (1) Does the theory of strict liability conflict with the warranty theory embodied in the Uniform Commercial
Code insofar as the Code defines a manufacturer's liability to a remote
consumer of a defective product for a purely economic loss? (2) Assuming that no such conflict does exist, which of the two theories is the
more suitable for determining the scope of the manufacturer's liability
for a purely economic loss? Therefore, before an attempt is made to
address these issues, a brief review of the pertinent sections of the Code
is appropriate.
The three sections of the Code which provide a suitable basis for
recovery for purely economic losses are section 2-313 which provides
for express warranties, section 2-314 which provides for an implied
warranty of merchantability, and section 2-315 which provides for an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular use. 08 Section 2-313 provides
that an express warranty by the seller may be created by any affirmation
of fact, promise, description of the goods, sample or model which
becomes part of the basis for the bargain. 0 9 The implied warranty of
107 See Franklin, supra note 39; Rapson, Products Liability Under ParallelDoctrines:
Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS
L. REV. 692 (1965); Comment, supra note 73; Comment, Seely v. White Motor Co.: Retrenchment in California on Strict Products Liability, 52 VA. L. REV. 509 (1966); Note,
supra note 19; Note, Products Liability: What Type of Loss Will the Doctrine of Strict
Liability in Tort Cover?, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 385 (1965); Note, Products Liability-Wholesaler
-Economic Loss, 19 U. ME. L. REv. 92 (1967); Note, Economic Loss from Defective Products, 4 WILiAMETrE L. REv. 402 (1967); 79 HARV. L. REV. 1315 (1966); 19 VAND. L. REV. 214
(1965).
108 UCC § 2-317 establishes a basis for determining the priority of warranties and
provides in pertinent part:
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with
each other and as cumulative, but if such construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining
that intention the following rules apply:
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
109 UCC § 2-313 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform
to the sample or model.
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merchantability created by section 2-314 is effectively an implied-in-law
guarantee by the seller to the buyer that the product would pass without
objection in the trade and is fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such products are used. 110 The implied warranty of fitness for a particular use provided by section 2-315 effectively imposes an implied-in-law
duty on the part of the seller to select and furnish a product suitable
for the buyer's requirements whenever the seller at the time of the
sale knows or has reason to know (1) the particular purpose or use for
which the product was required, and (2) that the buyer is relying on
skill or judgment of the seller to furnish suitable goods."'
Two other sections of the Code which are particularly pertinent
to products liability actions involving economically injured consumers
are sections 1-103 and 2-318. Section 1-103 provides that unless displaced by a particular provision of the Code, the traditional principles
Comment I to UCC § 2-313 states in pertinent part:
"Express" warranties rest on "dickered" aspects of the individual bargain,
and go so clearly to the essence of that bargain that words of disclaimer in a
form are repugnant to the basic dickered terms. "Implied" warranties rest so
clearly on a common factual situation or set of conditions that no particular
language or action is necessary to evidence them and they will arise in such a
situation unless unmistakably negated.
110 UCC § 2-314 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind ...
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used
UCC § 2-314, Comment 3 states in pertinent part:
A specific designation of goods by the buyer does not exclude the seller's
obligation that they be fit for the general purposes appropriate to such goods.
A contract for the sale of second-hand goods, however, involves only such
obligations as is appropriate to such goods for that is their contract description. A
person making an isolated sale of goods is not a "merchant" within the meaning
of the full scope of this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would
apply.
111 UCC § 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall
be fit 'for such purpose.
UCC § 2-315, Comment 2 states in pertinent part:
A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which the
goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to
the nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes for which goods are
used are those envisaged in the concept of merchantability and go to uses which
are customarily made of the goods in question.
See note 121 infra dealing with UCC § 2-316's modification of warranties.
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of law and equity shall supplement the Code. 11 2 As a result, the technical
rules of privity still generally apply. The only section of the Code which
purports to modify or displace the privity requirement is section 2-318
for which three alternative choices are available. The adopting jurisdictions may choose one of the alternatives according to their own
particular predilections and case law. 113 The most limited of the choices,
Alternative A, provides that a seller's express and implied warranties
made pursuant to a sale of goods extend at least to such direct beneficiaries of the sale as family members and household guests of the
buyer who are personally injured as a proximate result of a breach of
any of the seller's warranties. Alternative A also expressly prohibits the
seller from excluding such direct beneficiaries from the benefit of the
14
seller's warranties."
Although Alternative A frees only the family members and household guests of the purchaser from the technical rules of privity, the
UCC § 1-103 provides inpertinent part:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant . . . shall supplement its provisions.
113 UCC § 2-318, Comment 3 states:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section in
this form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case
law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to
other persons in the distributive chain. The second alternative is designed for
states where the case law has already developed further and for those that desire
to expand the class of beneficiaries. The third alternative goes further, following
the trend of modern decisions as indicated by Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A
(Tentative Draft No. 10, 1965) in extending the rule beyond injuries to the
person ....
Several states have chosen not to codify even the limited abrogation of privity in Alternative A, e.g., California, CAL. COMM. CODE § 2318 (West 1964), and Texas, TEx. Bus. & COM.
CODE § 2.318 (1968).
114 UCC § 2-318 provides:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who
is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual
to whom the warranty extends. As amended 1966.
112
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Code, nevertheless, expresses strict neutrality on the issue of whether
the seller's warranties extend to more remote beneficiaries. 115 To avoid
restricting the developing case law in those jurisdictions which extend
warranty coverage to a broader class of beneficiaries, two additional
alternative choices for section 2-318 have been proposed. Alternative B
enlarges the class of potentially protected beneficiaries by abrogating
the privity rule with respect to those personally injured who would be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the manufacturer's product. 1 6 Alternative C extends the class of potentially protected beneficiaries still further by relaxing privity with respect to those users,
consumers, and affected persons suffering any type of injury whatsoever. 1 7 Thus, the three alternative choices for section 2-318 do no
more than relax the privity rule in varying degrees according to the
type of person injured and the type of injury suffered.
Two other sections of the Code which are also particularly pertinent to the issue of product-caused economic loss are sections 2-607
and 2-719. Section 2-607 requires that the buyer notify the seller within
a reasonable time after he discovers a breach of warranty or be barred
from a remedy." 8 Since section 2-318 effectively grants the same rights
115 UCC § 2-318, Comment 3, note 113 supra. Cf. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 390-93,
221 A.2d 320, 323-25 (1966).
Privity of contract has frequently been classified into two categories which are useful
in the context of a products liability action: vertical privity and horizontal privity:
Vertical privity exists where the actual purchaser proceeds against his remote
vendor. His direction of suit is upward, through the series of sales which culminated in his purchase. Horizontal privity, on the other hand, begins with the
user of the product and ends with the ultimate purchaser. The user's movement
is across as he attempts to reach the legal position occupied by the purchaser.
Note, Products Liability: Employees and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-318, 68
DICK. L. REv. 444, 446 (1964).
There has been some controversy as to whether UCC § 2-318 was intended to relax
the requirement for vertical privity, horizontal privity or both. At least one court has held
that UCC § 2-318, Alternative A effectively relaxes only the horizontal privity requirement.
See, e.g., Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. at 390-93, 221 A.2d at 323-25 (relying on Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 612-14, 187 A.2d 575, 577-78 (1963)). One commentator has
argued, however, that such a constrictive interpretation would be inconsistent with the
drafters' expression of strict neutrality on the privity issue set forth in Comment 3 to UCC
§ 2-318, note 113 supra; and that the drafters intended that questions concerning horizontal
and vertical privity be left to the adopting jurisdictions. Franklin, supra note 39, at 9991000. See Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of
Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281, 322-28 (1961). For the purpose of comparing the
strict liability and the Code approaches to the problems of direct and consequential economic loss, it will be assumed herein that all of the alternative choices for UCC § 2-318
relax the vertical, as well as the horizontal, privity requirement.
116 See note 113 supra.
117 Id.
118 UCC § 2-607 provides in pertinent part;
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to a remote consumer of a defective product that a direct purchaser
would have, the purchaser's corresponding duty to seasonably notify
the seller of a breach of warranty is delegated to the remote consumer.
Thus, the remote consumer, like the direct purchaser, must personally
notify the manufacturer of a defective product after suffering an economic loss or lose his right to sue for breach of warranty." 9
Section 2-719 of the Code permits the manufacturer to severely
limit any liability he may possibly incur for a breach of warranty,
provided that such a disclaimer is consistent with the requirements
of section 2-316 and provided that it is not unconscionable under section 2-302.120 Section 2-316 requires that a disclaimer must be in writing,
be conspicuous, and fairly appraise the buyer of the risk he has undertaken. 121 The term unconscionability is undefined in section 2-302 or
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any
remedy ....
Ili See UCC § 2-607, Comment 5 which provides:
Under this Article various beneficiaries are given rights for injuries sustained
by them because of the seller's breach of warranty. Such a beneficiary does not
fall within the reason of the present section in regard to discovery of defects and
the giving of notice within a reasonable time after acceptance, since he has nothing
to do with acceptance. However, the reason of this section does extend to requiring
the beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred. What is said
above, with regard to the extended time for reasonable notification from the lay
consumer after the injury is also applicable here; but even a beneficiary can be
properly held to the use of good faith in notifying, once he has had time to
become aware of the legal situation.
120 UCC § 2-719 provides in pertinent part:
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
One method of limiting damages is by providing for liquidated damages. UCC § 2-718(1)
provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but
only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual
harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
UCC § 2-718, Comment 1 provides:
Under subsection (1) liquidated damage clauses are allowed where the amount
involved is reasonable in the light of the circumstances of the case. The subsection
sets forth explicitly the elements to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a liquidated damage clause. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is expressly made void as a penalty. An unreasonably small amount would
be subject to similar criticism and might be stricken under the section on
unconscionable contracts or clauses.
Compare with UCC § 2-302, note 122 infra.
121 UCC § 2-316 provides in pertinent part:
(2) [T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any
part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing
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anywhere else in the Code.122 However, as is the case of all undefined
terms in the Code, it is construed to include all of the elements of the
common law concept of unconscionability. 123 Although disclaimers as
to liability for personal injuries are frequently held to be unconscionable, rarely is a disclaimer for a purely economic loss. 124 In fact, section
2-719 expressly provides that a manufacturer may effectively disclaim
or limit his liability for a purely economic loss, provided that it is not
unconscionable to do so.
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods
must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness
the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous....
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty ....
UCC § 2-316, Comment 7 states in pertinent part:
Such terms [as "as is," "as they stand," "with all faults," and the like] in ordinary
commercial usage are understood to mean that the buyer takes the entire risk as
to the quality of the goods involved.
UCC § 2-302, Comment 1, note 122 infra.
122 UCC § 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid
the court in making the determination.
UCC § 2-302, Comment 1 states in pertinent part:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of
the making of the contract. . . . The principle is one of the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power.
123 See generally Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Crowd-Consumers and the Common
Law Tradition, 31 U. Pim. L. Rav. 349 (1970).
124 But see Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 543-45, 279 A.2d 640, 651-53 (1971). See
generally Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 337
(1970); Lauer, Sales Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Mo. L. REV. 259
(1965); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 485 (1967); Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PiTT. L. Rav. 1
(1969); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931 (1969);
Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 109 U. PA. L. Rv.
401 (1961).
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but limitation of damages where the
is prima fade unconscionable
25
loss is commercial is not.1

All of the alternative choices for section 2-318 relax or abrogate
the privity requirement in varying degrees, depending upon the type
of injury suffered and the type of injured consumer.126 But none of
these alternatives purport to relax or abrogate the scope and effect of the
disclaimer, notice, and liability limitation provisions of sections 2-316,
2-607, and 2-719 respectively. 27 Consequently, insofar as disclaimers,
notice requirements, and liability limitations are concerned, the remote
consumer's rights rise no higher under the Code than those of a direct
purchaser who is in privity of contract with the manufacturer. It is,
therefore, submitted that the manufacturer still has a statutory right
under the Code to avail himself of the affirmative defenses provided
by these provisions in an effort to protect himself against liability for a
UCC § 2-719(3).
The two jurisdictions, Michigan and New Jersey, which have allowed recovery
for direct economic loss, have adopted UCC § 2-318, Alternative A. MicH. Comps,. LAWS ANN.
§ 440.2318 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-318 (1962).
Of the seven jurisdictions, Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Oregon, Tennessee,
and Texas, that have been presented with and decided a claim in strict liability for
either a direct or consequential economic loss, two, California and Texas, have declined to
adopt any of the alternative choices for UCC § 2-318, four, Arizona, Illinois, Oregon, and
Tennessee, have adopted UCC § 2-318, Alternative A, and one, Colorado, has adopted a
form equivalent to UCC § 2-318, Alternative C. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-2335 (1967);
CAL. Com-M. CODE § 2318 (1964); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-2-318 (1965); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 26, § 2-318 (Smith-Hurd 1963); ORE. REV. STAT. § 72.3180 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-2-318 (1964); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 2.318 (1968). It therefore appears that a
commercially injured consumer, who is sufficiently far removed from a remote manufacturer so as not to come within the relaxed privity rule of UCC § 2-318, Alternative A,
is left without a remedy in those jurisdictions, Arizona, Oregon, and Tennessee, which
have adopted UCC § 2-318, Alternative A, and which bar recovery in strict liability for
direct and consequential economic losses.
Illinois, which has adopted UCC § 2-318, Alternative A, has apparently extended the
scope of the alternative by allowing recovery upon the third-party beneficiary theory to a
remote commercial consumer for both direct and consequential economic losses in the
Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966).
Whether the other strict liability jurisdictions that have adopted Alternative A and
rejected strict liability for direct and consequential economic losses will move similarly to
fill the vacuum left by the Code and the doctrine of strict liability, remains to be seen.
Virginia, which apparently has not yet extended application of the doctrine of strict
liability beyond adulterated food cases, has chosen to adopt an amended version of UCC
§ 2-318 which is of a scope similar to UCC § 2-318, Alternative C. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318
(1965). Most other jurisdictions, which have not yet adopted any form of strict products
liability, have chosen to adopt UCC § 2-318, Alternative A. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 85-2-318 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-2-318 (1963). Utah, which has not yet adopted
strict liability has, like California, refused to enact any form of UCC § 2-318. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 70A-2-318 (1968). See note 113 supra.
127 Compare UCC § 2-318, Alternatives A, B, and C with UCC §§ 2-316, 2-607, and
2-719, in notes 121, 118, and 120, respectively, supra.
125
126
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purely economic loss. When the manufacturer avails himself of these
remedy limitation and risk allocation provisions, he also has the statu28
tory right to expect that they will be enforced by the courts.
Neither the Santor case nor the Cova case expressly involved a
disclaimer, breached notice requirement or a liability limitation. But
it is clear that the Santor and Cova courts intended to protect economically-injured consumers against such statutory defenses by allowing
them to alternatively recover in strict liability. 29 The Santor and Cova
cases have, therefore, cast grave doubts as to the continued viability of
these statutory rights and have, in effect, undermined the authority
of the Code in New Jersey and Michigan.130 Manufacturers in these
states can no longer rely upon the disclaimers, notice provisions, and
liability limitations of the Code to provide a dependable definition of
their potential liability for direct economic losses. Instead, they are
forced to look with uncertainty to the rather elastic and still developing
law of strict liability. This can hardly be the result that the legislatures
of New Jersey and Michigan had in mind when they adopted the Code,
for among the Code's express purposes are "to simplify, clarify and
modernize the law governing commercial transactions;"' 13 1 and the

language of section 1-103 demonstrates legislative intent to displace
common law in the area of commercial transactions that is inconsistent
with the provisions of the Code.1 32 It is thus apparent that the legislatures of these two states believed that adoption of a uniform statutory
scheme for regulating commercial transactions would be more effective
than the common law approach.
Inasmuch as the Code has expressed strict neutrality on the privity
issue, it may be inferred that the legislatures of New Jersey and Michigan have assented, sub silentio, to a broad relaxation of the privity
rule by their courts. However, they clearly have not assented to a circumvention and undermining of the Code's risk-allocation and remedy
limitation provisions. 33 Unlike their attitude on the privity rule, the
128 See generally Franklin, supra note 39, at 980-83; Note, supra note 19, at 918-19,

925-26.
129 See 44 N.J. at 62-66, 207 A.2d at 310-12; 26 Mich. App. at 608-11, 182 N.W.2d
at 804-05.
130 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 440.1102 et seq. (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:1-102
et seq. (1962).
'31 UCC § 1-102 provides in pertinent part:
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions ....
132 See note 112 supra.
133 Note, supra note 19, at 962 states:
To the extent that the consumer may seek full recovery against the manufac-
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legislatures of New Jersey and Michigan have shown no signs of being
flexible or susceptible to changes in the areas of the Code's risk-allocation and remedy limitation provisions. 134 It is, therefore, concluded
that the legislatures of these states intended that the Code was to exclusively control the problem of direct economic loss, and that the courts
of these states are duty-bound to respect the will of their legislatures by
applying the Code in all situations involving direct economic loss. The
Santor and Cova courts have, by alternatively adopting strict liability
in an area which the Code controls, breached this duty and, in effect,
have engaged in a round of judicial legislation. 13 5
Notably, the same results which were achieved in the Santor and
Cova cases through the application of strict liability could also have
been achieved under the Code by relaxing the privity rule and by
decreeing that disclaimers, notice requirements, and liability limitations, insofar as they extend to ordinary and small commercial consumers, are prima facie unconscionable. 136 Such an approach would
certainly be preferable to extending the concept of strict liability in
tort to allow recovery for direct economic losses. After all, the theory
of strict liability, when stripped to its essential features, is little more
than a theory of warranty in which disclaimers, notice requirements,
and liability limitations are invalid and in which privity has been
abrogated. 3 7 The Code approach would not only effectively provide
the same result as strict liability, it would also preserve the welldeveloped notion that the law of contract should control actions for
purely economic losses and that the law of tort should control actions
for personal injuries. Conceptually, the type of injury would determine
turer regardless of any limitation in the manufacturer's contract with his intermediary, the Code's regulation of commercial affairs is undermined.
134 See Comments to UCC §§ 2-316, 2-607, 2-718, and 2-719; MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 440.2316, 440.2607, 440.2718, and 440.2719 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:2-316, 2-607,
2-718, and 2-719 (1962).
135 One commentator has argued, that inasmuch as the Uniform Commercial Code
deals with both personal injuries and property damages arising out of the sale of a
defective product, the Code now displaces the common law relating to both types of harm,
because the Code represents the legislature's answer to how the courts should solve the
problems of strict liability. Franklin, supra note 39, at 1016-20. See also Miller v. Preitz,
422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966); Note, supra note 19, at 958-64.
136 See Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. Pirr. L.
REv. 359, 372-74 (1970), in which the author proposes that a gross price disparity between
the sales price and the product value should make out a prima facie case of unconscionability.
137 W. PRossM,
supra note 1, § 99, at 658 n.57 (quoting from Greeno v. Clark Equip.
Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965)) stated:
Strict liability in tort "is hardly more than what exists under implied warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer, requirements
of notice of defect, and limitation through inconsistencies with express warranties."
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whether strict liability or the law of warranty would govern. If warranty controls, then the validity of disclaimers, notice provisions, and
liability limitations would depend upon the relative bargaining positions of the parties and the type of plaintiff, that is, whether he is an
ordinary or a commercial consumer. Based on the particular fact situation, courts in strict liability jurisdictions could first decide whether
to grant recovery and then justify the awarding of damages in the face
of disclaimers, notice provisions, and liability limitations by expanding
the concept of prima facie unconscionability set forth in section 2-719.138
While a yardstick for measuring unconscionability would have to be
developed on a case-by-case basis, this is precisely the approach courts
have followed in determining whether to allow recovery in strict lia139
bility for a direct economic loss.
According to this reasoning, Santor supports the proposition that
it is unconscionable for a large manufacturer to disclaim liability for a
direct economic loss suffered by an ordinary remote consumer. 140 Cova
extends Santor further, standing for the proposition that it is also unconscionable for a large manufacturer to disclaim liability for a direct
economic loss suffered by a small commercial consumer. 41 Conversely,
Seely and all of the other cases which have explicitly denied recovery
in strict liability for direct economic losses, support the proposition
that it is not unconscionable for a large manufacturer to disclaim or
severely limit liability for a direct economic loss suffered by a com42
mercial consumer, irrespective of his size.'
All of the jurisdictions which have refused to permit recovery in
143
strict liability for a direct economic loss have also denied recovery,
or would be expected to deny recovery, in strict liability for consequential economic losses.' 44 While only Michigan and New Jersey permit
See note 120 supra. Cf. UCC §§ 2-302, 2-316, 2-607, 2-718, and 2-719.
See Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970); Santor v. A & M Karagbeusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
140 44 N.J. at 63-66, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
141 26 Mich. App. at 609, 619, 182 N.W.2d at 804, 810.
142 Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013, 1019-20
(9th Cir. 1970) (applying Arizona law); Miehle Co. v. Smith-Brooks Printing Co., 303 F.
Supp. 501, 504 (D. Colo. 1969) (applying Colorado law); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 9, 16-19, 403 P.2d 145, 150-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22-24 (1965); Price v. Gatlin, 241
Ore. 315, 317, 405 P.2d 502, 503 (1965); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey, 472 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971).
143 Cases cited note 142 supra.
144 Cf. Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 977-79, 154 S.E.2d 140, 144-45
(1967) (action based upon implied warranty of fitness to recover for consequential economic
losses held barred by express disclaimer of all implied warranties), in which the court
stated:
138

139
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recovery in strict liability for a direct economic loss, neither has been
squarely presented with the question of whether a consequential economic loss is recoverable in strict liability. Although the Michigan
court in Cova recognized that it was abstractly presented with the question, it declined to resolve the issue on the basis of the facts in the
case.

14 5

There is a basic distinction between the Cova and Santor fact situations. Cova involved a claim by a small commercial consumer who
suffered both direct and consequential economic losses, 146 while Santor
involved a claim by a small ordinary consumer who suffered only a
direct economic loss. 14 7 Both cases permitted recovery for direct eco-

nomic losses, reasoning that recovery in strict liability should not
depend upon the type of injury suffered. 48 Santor did not consider
the question of whether a distinction should be made on the basis
of the type of plaintiff, but directed itself solely to the question of
whether strict liability should be limited to personal injury cases.
[A]lthough the doctrine has been applied principally in connection
with personal injuries sustained by expected users from products
which are dangerous when defective .

.

. the responsibility of the

maker should be no different where damage to149the article sold or
to other property of the consumer is involved.
The Cova court also did not appear to be concerned with the type
of plaintiff insofar as the claim for direct economic loss was concerned,
but it did hint that recovery for a consequential economic loss might
depend upon the type of plaintiff involved.
If damages for loss of profits are awarded it will be soon enough to
consider whether there should be limitations on the kinds of plaintiffs who will be permitted to recover consequential damages .... 150
A reading of the Henningsen case [Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)] and a tracing of its questionable acceptance in other
jurisdictions since it was decided in 1960 fail to convince us of the efficacy of
following the action of the New Jersey court. We are loathe to make such abrupt
changes in settled law and reluctant to declare invalid the formal undertakings of
parties for such vague reasons of public policy.
[I]f the legislature did not in 1964 [when Virginia adopted the Uniform Commercial Code] recognize the existence of public policy reasons sufficient to require it
to say that there shall be no exclusion of implied warranties of fitness in the sale
of personal property, then certainly this court cannot say that such reasons
existed in 1962, when this controversy had its beginning.
145 26 Mich. App. 602, 620, 182 N.W.2d 800, 811 (1970).
146 Id. at 603-04, 182 N.W.2d at 801. See note 43 supra.
'47 44 N.J. at 55-57, 207 A.2d at 306-07. See note 43 supra.
148 26 Mich. App. at 608-09, 182 N.W.2d at 804; 44 N.J. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.
149 44 N.J. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
150 26 Mich. App. at 620, 182 N.W.2d at 811.
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In this respect, Cova appears to agree with Justice Peters' contention in
his concurring and dissenting opinion in Seely:
What is important is not the nature of the damage but the relative
roles played by the parties to the purchase contract and the nature
of their transaction. 151
Unlike Justice Peters, however, the Cova court did not indicate that
where the plaintiff is a commercial consumer, recovery in strict liability
for a consequential economic loss should depend solely upon the relative bargaining positions of the parties. 152 Despite the fact that both
parties were engaged in commercial enterprises in Seely, Justice Peters
concluded that plaintiff should be entitled to recover in strict liability
for his consequential economic loss solely upon the basis of plaintiff's
53
inferior bargaining position.
Based on the foregoing analysis of the Code, it is submitted that
the Code exclusively controls the question of consequential as well as
direct economic loss. However, since the courts of New Jersey and
Michigan have effectively ignored the Code in cases involving direct
economic losses, 54 it is surmised that they may also elect to disregard
the Code in cases involving consequential economic losses. The problem of consequential economic loss, therefore, invites analysis from the
standpoint of determining whether strict liability or the Code provides
a more appropriate remedy.
All types of consumers can suffer a consequential economic loss,
but the magnitude of a consequential loss which can be suffered by an
ordinary consumer is necessarily limited by the types of loss he can
incur, such as loss of wages, increased expenditures, and similar indirect losses. Thus, consequential economic losses suffered by an ordinary
consumer resemble direct economic losses in that they are limited in
scope, are easy to measure, and are inherently susceptible of proof.
There is, however, a logical reason for distinguishing between consequential and direct economic losses. Unlike an ordinary consumer, a
commercial consumer may suffer consequential economic losses of
virtually unlimited scope, because only he is capable of suffering expectation losses, namely, losses of business profits and business oppor151 63 Cal. 2d at 21-22, 403 P.2d at 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (Peters, J.,
and dissenting).
152 Id. at 25-27, 403 P.2d at 156-57, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29 (Peters, J.,
and dissenting).
153 Id. at 27-28, 403 P.2d at 157-58, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30 (Peters, J.,
and dissenting).
154 Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).

concurring
concurring
concurring
800 (1970);
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tunities. Being speculative and elusive, expectation losses are usually
difficult to ascertain and measure. 155
When only commercial parties are involved, a determination of
the most appropriate remedy for a consequential economic loss depends upon the analysis of two divergent and extreme situations. In
one situation, the financial strengths of the manufacturer and the commercial consumer and, therefore, their relative bargaining positions,
are substantially the same; in the other, one party enjoys a grossly
advantageous bargaining position.
In the former situation, the manufacturer and the commercial
consumer are usually in privity of contract, and the terms of the deal
are negotiated directly with the aid of competent counsel. As a result,
there is little opportunity for surprise or oppression, and the consumer
usually has an adequate remedy under the Code for any expectation
economic loss. None of the compelling reasons for adopting strict liability, which exist in cases involving personal injury, are present in
this situation.'5 6 The injured commercial consumer is not usually
forced to deal with and rely to his detriment upon the manufacturer's
expertise, for it is rare that he does not have an adequate selection
of manufacturers with which to deal and a staff of his own consultants
and experts. 157 Moreover, the manufacturer is in no better position
than the commercial consumer to insure against potential expectation
losses. Unlike a direct economic loss, which is limited to the purchase
price or the represented value of the product and any direct, incidental
expenditures that may be incurred in replacing it, an expectation loss
could conceivably expose the manufacturer to virtually unlimited liability. 58 This is precisely the type of situation the Code was intended
to control.'5 9 Neither the doctrine of strict liability nor an expanded
concept of unconscionability is a particularly appropriate theory of
recovery where one of two substantially equal commercial parties suffers
an expectation loss.' 6 0
155 See Note, supra note 19, at 956.
156 Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. at 317, 405 P.2d at 503. See Seely v. White Motor Co.,
63 Cal. 2d at 14-16, 403 P.2d at 149-50, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22.
157 See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, TORTS § 7.7, at 557 (1956). Cf. Note, supra note 19,
at 945.
158 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d at 17-18, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr.
at 22-23; Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931); Note,
supra note 19, at 944-45.
159 See sources cited note 19 supra.
160 See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglass Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95,
47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). See generally Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE
L.J. 887, 932-34 (1967).
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The other extreme situation involves either a small commercial
consumer and a large manufacturer, or a small manufacturer and a
large commercial consumer. A large manufacturer can usually, as a result of a vastly superior bargaining position, disclaim or severely limit
any liability that he might possibly incur for an expectation loss which
is suffered by a small commercial consumer. The small commercial consumer is, therefore, placed upon the horns of a dilemma. If he refuses
to accept the manufacturer's terms, it is quite likely that the manufacturer will decide that the anticipated profits from the sale are not
worth the risk of liability and, therefore, he will not sell the consumer
the product he needs to carry on his business.' 6' Yet, if the consumer
chooses to accept the manufacturer's terms, an expectation loss is likely
to drive him into insolvency. Insurance is not the answer, for even if
insurance were obtainable, the small commercial consumer quite likely
could not afford the expense of the premiums. 1 62 Turning to other
manufacturers is usually no solution to the dilemma, for industry-wide
disclaimers and liability limitations are often the rule, not the exception. 1'

The Code, which is predicated upon the proposition that the

contracting parties are in a position of equal bargaining strength, is
ill-equipped to handle such a situation. Indeed, the Code's liberal provisions for warranty disclaimer and liability limitations, 164 originally
adopted to promote freedom of contract, tend to restore many of the
unfair advantages to the manufacturer that abrogation of the privity
65
requirement was intended to eliminate.
161 Kessler, supra note 19, at 632. Justice Francis stated in his well-known opinion
in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960):
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who are
brought together by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing
of approximate economic equality. In such a society there is no danger that freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole. But in present-day
commercial life the standardized mass contract has appeared. It is used primarily
by enterprises with strong bargaining power and position. "The weaker party, in
need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position to shop around for
better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly
(natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to terms dictated
by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often understood [sic] in a
vague way, if at all."
Id. at 389, 161 A.2d at 86 (quoting from Kessler, supra at 632). See also Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict oj Laws, 53 COLUM. L. Rav. 1072, 1075, 1089 (1953).
162 Franklin, supra note 39, at 984; Note, supra note 19, at 954-58.
163 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. at 396-97, 161 A.2d at 90-91 (1960).
But see Knecht v. Universal Motor Co., 113 N.W.2d 688, 694 (N.D. 1962); Williams v.
Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 665-66, 137 S.E.2d 225, 231 (1964).
164 UCC §§ 2-316, 2-718, and 2-719; see notes 120 and 121 supra.
165 Franklin; supra note 39, at 1013-14. Cf. UCC § 2-318, Alternatives A, B, and C,
supra note 113.
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On the contrary, the application of strict liability appears to favor
the commercial consumer, both large and small, at the expense of the
manufacturer. If strict liability were to be applied, the manufacturer
of a product utilized by a commercial consumer would be powerless to
limit his liability for an expectation loss in even the most reasonable
manner. 166 The problem would be particularly aggravated in a case
where the manufacturer was less financially powerful than the commercial consumer, as is often the situation in sales between business
enterprises. In such a case, it would be the manufacturer, rather than
the consumer, who would be confronted with the dilemma. If he were
to proceed with the sale, he would risk unlimited liability which could
drive him into insolvency. Yet, if he wished to avoid exposing himself
to unlimited liability, he would be forced to forego the sale, hardly a
reasonable choice in the situation.
CONCLUSION

Both the doctrine of strict liability, with its no-disclaimer philosophy, and the Code, with its liberal disclaimer philosophy, are inadequate vehicles for controlling the sensitive problems of direct and
consequential economic loss. Since these problems are both of a peculiarly contractual nature, however, they logically should both be controlled by the law of contract. It is, therefore, suggested that the concept
of unconscionability be expanded under the Code to control the problem of consequential economic loss as well as direct economic loss.
Although the concept of unconscionability is admittedly fact sensitive
and should be expanded upon a case-by-case basis, it is, nevertheless,
suggested that the following list of principles and conclusions be accorded considerable weight in the development of the concept. The
list is intended to be neither comprehensive nor exhaustive. Rather, it
is intended to be a concise outline of the general legal and equitable
concepts which appear to provide the most just and, at the same time,
the most practical solution to the problems of direct and consequential
economic loss.
First, privity has outlived its social utility and should be recognized
166 But see Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. at 67, 207 A.2d at 313, where the
court states:
[O]ne measure of the manufacturer's obligation necessarily must be the price at
which the manufacturer reasonably contemplated that the article might be sold.
It appears that the court was addressing itself to the case of a sale on an "as is" basis.

Compare with UCC § 2-316, Comment 7. See also Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d
at 28, 403 P.2d at 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
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only when fairly bargained for. Remoteness, irrespective of the degree,
is not a logical basis for denying an injured consumer standing to sue
a manufacturer.
Second, the most important consideration in developing an expanded concept of unconscionability should be the relative bargaining
positions of the parties. In cases where the parties bargain on substantially equal footing, the risk-allocation and remedy-limitation provisions
of the Code should be given effect. In cases, however, where the relative
bargaining positions of the parties are grossly unequal, risk-allocation
and liability-limitation provisions, permitting circumvention of liability, should be prima facie ineffective, but subject to rebuttal upon
demonstration of knowing, willing, and intelligent assent in noncoercive circumstances.
Third, the manufacturer should generally be held liable for the
full extent of direct economic loss. The imposition of such liability
would not unreasonably expose him to liability of an unknown and
potentially unlimited scope, because the burden would be limited to
the purchase price or represented value of the defective product, coupled with the incidental costs of replacing the product with an effective
substitute. No overriding economic considerations exist which warrant
the imposition of liability for personal injury and physical property
damage and not for direct economic loss.
Fourth, the manufacturer should be required to ascertain the potential for consequential economic loss at the time of the sale. Where
the probability of such a loss is appreciable and endangers the solvency
of the manufacturer, he should be allowed to reasonably limit his
potential liability provided he makes a good faith effort to prevent such
a loss. For instance, limitation might be allowed if the manufacturer
were to undertake a duty to periodically inspect, and perhaps even
maintain, products having potential to cause a substantial consequential economic loss. Limitation might also require that the manufacturer
provide insurance against such a loss. In any event, where the probability of a consequential economic loss is minimal and the potential for
such a loss meager when compared with the financial strength of the
manufacturer, he should be held liable to the full extent of the consumer's loss. There are no overriding economic considerations which
warrant the imposition of liability for personal injury and physical
property damage and not for consequential economic loss.
Fifth, other factors, such as the price of the product, its social benefits, the relative equities of the parties, the relative education of the
bargaining parties, the "state of the art" of the manufacturer's industry,
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the consumer's attempts to minimize his damages, and the nature of
the product, should be evaluated in the context of specific fact situations.
The genius of the common law lies in its ability, when presented
with a new problem, to provide a remedy and, thereafter, to find or to
develop a legal theory to justify it.167 When the problems of direct and
consequential economic loss were first seriously proposed as compensable injuries, the courts had difficulty finding an acceptable legal basis
upon which to justify recovery. As a result, sympathetic courts were
forced to justify recovery upon that old standby, public policy, and
numerous other legal fictions. This ad hoc approach has developed into
a hopeless morass of conflicting legal rationales and theories of recovery.
A new unified approach, which maintains the integrity and distinctness
of the traditional and well-developed notions of contract and tort law
without sacrificing the financial interests of either the consumer or the
manufacturer is, therefore, imperative. It is submitted that the expanded concept of unconscionability proposed herein may well provide
the ultimate solution to the vexing problems of direct and consequential economic loss.
Terrance A. Turner
167 Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. I (1870), reprinted in 44 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1931).

